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The Gig Is Up: An Analysis of the Gig-Economy
and an Outdated Worker Classification System in
Need of Reform
Travis Clark*
Lyft drivers don’t seem much like employees. We generally
understand an employee to be someone who works under the
direction of a supervisor for an extended or indefinite period of
time. But Lyft drivers don’t seem much like independent
contractors either. We generally understand an independent
contractor to be someone with a special skill (and with bargaining
power to negotiate a rate for use of that skill), who serves multiple
clients, performing discrete tasks for limited periods. Lyft drivers
require no special skill when they give rides. Their work is central,
not tangential to Lyft’s business.
- Judge Chhabria, United States District Court Judge,
San Francisco, CA1
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the gig-economy has resulted in one of the most
vulnerable workforces in generations.2 While the gig-economy has attracted
significant media attention for its market successes, it has raised concerns
about the workers who participate in it.3 These concerns arise, in part, from
* J.D., Seattle University School of Law. In loving memory of Anne Schetter-Clark
(1956-2016).
1 Antonio Aloisi, Commodotized Workers: Case Study Research on Labor Law Issues
Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig Economy” Platforms, 37 COMPAR. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 3 (2016) [https://perma.cc/8YFG-8MDP].
2 STEVEN HILL, RAW DEAL: HOW THE “UBER ECONOMY” AND RUNAWAY CAPITALISM
ARE SCREWING AMERICAN WORKERS 4–8 (1st ed. 2015).
3 CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44365, WHAT DOES THE GIG ECONOMY MEAN FOR
WORKERS? 1 (2017).
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gig-companies who have taken advantage of the United States’ worker
classification system.4
The current United States worker classification system is binary. It
requires employers to classify workers as employees or independent
contractors.5 This distinction is critical. Indeed, the structure of employment
relationships hinges entirely on how a worker is classified.6 This holds true
because an employer’s obligations to an employee are significantly greater
than obligations to an independent contractor.7 For employers, employee
status triggers “enormous liability” for payroll taxes, pension benefits, and
other employee benefits as well as liability for discrimination, sexual
harassment, and on-the-job injuries.8
Conversely, independent contractor status subjects employers to lower
costs and less regulation.9 Employers are not required to withhold taxes,
make social security or Medicare contributions, pay overtime wages, or
provide paid leave.10 Independent contractors are also deprived of
traditional statutory employment protections afforded to employees.11 In
addition, workplace discrimination, collective bargaining, and workers’
compensation statutes usually do not apply to non-employees.12
4 See id. at 2.
5 Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-
self-employed-or-employee [https://perma.cc/4Q7U-QCAC].
6 Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 686 F.3d 423, 430 (7th Cir. 2012); Richard
R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee when It Sees One and How It
Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 295, 296 (2001).
7 Carlson, supra note 6, at 297–98.
8 Id. at 298.
9 Myra H. Barron, Who’s an Independent Contractor? Who’s an Employee?, 14 LAB.
LAWYER 457 (1999).
10 Andrew G. Malik, Worker Classification and the Gig-Economy, 69 RUTGERS U.L.
REV. 1729, 1735, 1740 (2017).
11 Id. at 1734.
12 Id.
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Furthermore, an independent contractor seeking the protection of these
statutes often bears the burden of proving their employee status.13
Naturally, then, employers tend to misclassify their workers as
independent contractors to avoid these costs.14 The gig-economy is no
different.15 The current system “encourages [gig] companies like Uber and
Lyft to treat its workers like independent contractors rather than
employees.”16 In fact, the gig-economy’s success depends on the
misclassification of millions of workers.17 After all, companies like Uber
can save up to 30% on payroll taxes alone with the independent contractor
classification.18 This tendency to misclassify workers as independent
contractors can actively harm many workers in the gig-economy.19 The
binary worker classification system has constructed workplace regimes
where no employment protections exist for independent contractors.20
Dependence on this system is outdated and ill-suited to protect vulnerable
gig-workers.21
The current system is also ill-equipped to protect a burgeoning economy
from debilitating regulatory risk.22 Economists, legislators, and employers
have expressed grave concerns that a new classification for gig-workers
13 Id.
14 Leticia M. Saucedo, The Legacy of the Immigrant Workplace: Lessons for the 21st
Century Economy, 40 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 10 (2017).
15 Id. at 17.
16 Steven Chung, In the Gig Economy, Who Is an Employee And Who Is an Independent
Contractor?, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 2, 2019), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/10/in-the-
gig-economy-who-is-an-employee-and-who-is-an-independent-contractor/
[https://perma.cc/63JD-AMUG].
17 Id. at 11.
18 Saucedo, supra note 14, at 17.
19 Malik, supra note 10, at 1734; Saucedo, supra note 14, at 13.
20 Saucedo, supra note 14, at 5.
21 Spencer Bankhead & D. Taylor Petersen, Finding the Middle Ground: Establishing a
Third, Hybrid Worker Classification, 33 BYU PRELAW REV. 53 (2019).
22 Id.
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will overly burden employers with increased costs.23 They worry that these
higher costs will be passed onto the consumer and ultimately stifle
economic innovation.24
Thus, the Washington State Legislature should adopt a new hybrid
statutory worker classification: the marketplace contractor. This new
classification should address exploitation of gig-workers by providing
various basic employment protections while keeping costs down for
innovative gig-companies.
II. STRUCTURE OF THIS NOTE
Part III of this note explains what the gig-economy is, the structural
problems that exist within it, and some of the arguments for and against its
proliferation over the past decade. Part IV pivots into the arena of worker
classification. It serves four functions. First, it will explain the general
differences between independent contractors and employees. Second, it will
explain the inherent ambiguity that exists within the current worker
classification system. Third, it will outline the various consequences of
misclassification for the state, worker, and employer. Fourth, it will survey
the different classification tests used in the United States, including the test
used in Washington State. Part V will introduce the hybrid classification:
the marketplace contractor. It will explain what and how this new
classification will address the pitfalls in the current worker classification
system. Part VI will suggest and detail specific definitional statutes that
Washington State should incorporate into its statutory scheme. Part VII will
address some of the outstanding arguments against a hybrid classification.
Lastly, Part VIII will conclude this note.
23 See generally Andre Andoyan, Independent Contractor or Employee: I’m Uber
Confused! Why California Should Create an Exception for Uber Drivers and the “On-
Demand Economy”, 47 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 153 (2017).
24 Id.
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III. THE GIG-ECONOMY—THE ECONOMY OF TOMORROW
A. What Is the Gig-Economy?
In its earliest form, the gig-economy referred to musicians performing
“gigs” at various jazz clubs, bars, and concert halls.25 Its current usage
began “at the height of the 2009 financial crisis in early 2009, when the
unemployed made a living by ‘gigging,’ or working several part time
jobs.”26 But throughout its usage, the gig-economy has been a labor market
characterized by short-term or freelance employment relationships that
offers flexible hours.27 Gig-workers typically work irregular schedules that
are driven by fluctuations in demand for their services.28 Most gig-workers
are paid on a piecework basis.29 In other words, they are paid per task rather
than hourly.30
Recent technological advancements and the proliferation of the
smartphone have reshaped the gig-economy and commercial landscape.31
Increased use of the smartphone has contributed significantly to the growth
of the gig-economy through the creation of digitally mediated labor
marketplaces and platforms.32




27 Bill Wilson, What Is the ‘Gig’ Economy?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-38930048 [https://perma.cc/ANF3-JJ8K].
28 Andrew Stewart & Jim Stanford, Regulating Work in the Gig Economy: What Are the
Options?, 28 ECON. & LAB. RELS. REV. 420, 421 (2017).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 3, at 2.
32 HANNAH JOHNSTON & CHRIS LAND-KAZLAUSKAS, INT’L LAB. OFF. – GENEVA,
ORGANIZING ON-DEMAND: REPRESENTATION, VOICE, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN THE GIG-ECONOMY 3 (2019).
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As a result, the gig-economy is generally understood to include two
forms of work: “crowd-work” and “work-on-demand-via-app.”33 Crowd-
work is labor executed through online platforms that connect organizations,
businesses, individuals, and clients with workers.34 It often involves menial
and monotonous online “microtasks” (e.g. tagging photos, completing
surveys) that are beyond the capabilities of artificial intelligence.35
Accordingly, crowd-work is chiefly executed online, allowing workers to
operate anywhere in the world.36
Work-on-demand-via-app, however, involves the execution of traditional
working activities like transporting, cleaning, shopping, and other various
forms of traditional work.37 This labor is channeled through smartphone
applications managed by technology firms (Uber, DoorDash, etc.) who
select, manage, and set minimum quality standards for their workforce.38
Despite its similar online nature, work-on-demand-via-app differs from
crowd-work because it matches online supply and demand of activities that
are executed locally.39
The flexibility for workers and consumers alike has led to unprecedented
market success for gig-economy retailers and service providers.40 However,
the gig-economy is staffed by many who have no choice but to participate
in a labor market plagued with poor working conditions.41
33 Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work,
Crowd Work and Labour Protection in the “Gig-Economy”, 37 COMPAR. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 471, 473 (2016).
34 Id. at 473–74.
35 Id. at 474.
36 Id. at 473.
37 Id.
38 Aloisi, supra note 1; Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
ONLINE 85 (2015).
39 De Stefano, supra note 33, at 473.
40 UTTAM BAJWA ET AL., GLOBAL MIGRATION & HEALTH INITIATIVE, TOWARDS AN
UNDERSTANDING OF WORKERS’ EXPERIENCES IN THE GLOBAL GIG ECONOMY (2018),
https://www.glomhi.org/uploads/7/4/4/8/74483301/workers_in_the_global_gig_economy
.pdf [https://perma.cc/PHB7-HH8T].
41 Saucedo, supra note 14, at 13.
The Gig Is Up 775
VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 3 • 2021
B. The Gig-Economy’s Shortcomings
The gig-economy has seismically shifted the traditional workplace model
to be more individualized, independent, and impersonal.42 But this
impersonal relationship inherent to the gig-economy has created an
environment that lacks employer accountability.43 Consequently, working
conditions for the vast majority of gig-workers appear to be poor,
irrespective of the work being performed.44 These conditions are largely
defined by low wages, increased health and safety risks, and a lack of basic
employment benefits.45
1. Low Wages
While independent contractors usually earn more than employees who do
similar work, this higher wage has not materialized for many gig-workers.46
Gig-workers are often paid less than their bricks-and-mortar counterparts.47
About twice as many gig-workers earned less than $30,000.00 per year
when compared to the general United States population—an income that is
far below a living wage for a family of four.48 “One study found that
42 Paul E. Goately, Workplace Safety in the Gig Economy Is Anyone Actually Paying
Attention, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://ohsonline.com/articles/2019/12/16/workplace-safety-in-the-gig-economy-is-
anyone-actually-paying-attention.aspx [https://perma.cc/23KU-V5MX].
43 Taraneh Azar, As Gig Economy Booms, Accountability Is Harder to Pinpoint, SCOPE
(Feb. 17, 2020), https://thescopeboston.org/3165/features/gig-economy-accountability-
harder-pinpoint/ [https://perma.cc/D8TR-LMZ6].
44 Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Employers?
Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 619, 627
(2016).
45 Id.
46 Nick Kolakowski, Do Contractors Earn More than Full-Time Employees?, DICE (Feb.
21, 2019), https://insights.dice.com/2019/02/21/contractors-earn-full-time-employees-
2019/ [https://perma.cc/QVN5-GKD3].
47 Arne L. Kalleberg & Michael Dunn, Good Jobs, Bad Jobs in the Gig Economy, 20
PERSPS. ON WORK 10 (2016).
48 Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy: Lower Wages, More Injuries, Horrible Benefits: It’s
Worse than You Think, LITERARY HUB (June 14, 2018), https://lithub.com/the-gig-
economy-lower-wages-more-injuries-horrible-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/S624-JW35].
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contracted cleaners and security guards earned 15 and 17 percent less,
respectively, than their in-house peers.”49 Another 2016 study found that
misclassified workers’ net income is often much less than that of similar
workers who are classified as employees.50 And low wages for gig-work is
unfortunately not isolated to the United States. For example, nearly a
quarter of Britain’s gig-workers in 2018 were paid below minimum wage.
Moreover, companies like Uber can depress and stagnate wages by
switching their demand for labor on and off on a minute-by-minute basis.51
On top of low wages, many gig-workers are forced to incur operational
and other expenses otherwise covered under a traditional employment
relationship.52 An Uber driver, for example, must own a vehicle, pay for gas
and maintenance, and pay taxes on wages earned.53 Many gig-workers are
therefore forced to work long and irregular hours to earn a living wage.54
49 Id.
50 SARAH LEBERSTEIN & CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT,
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR VS. EMPLOYEE: WHY INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
CLASSIFICATION MATTERS AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO STOP IT (2016).
51 Jim Edwards, The ‘Gig Economy’ Is Destroying Wages, BUS. INSIDER (May 22,
2017), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/low-unemployment-wage-increases-gig-
economy-2017-5 [https://perma.cc/S2UL-EMT9]; see also Sage Lazzaro, Uber Drivers
Plan Boycott After Fare Cuts Slash Their Earnings to Below Minimum Wage, OBSERVER
(Jan. 19, 2016), https://observer.com/2016/01/uber-drivers-plan-boycott-after-fare-cuts-
slash-their-earnings-to-below-minimum-wage/ [https://perma.cc/9L6P-DMS4].
52 Kalleberg & Dunn, supra note 47.
53 Kathleen Elkins, A Day in the Life of an Uber, Lyft and Juno Eriver Who Makes About
$6,000 a Month in NYC, CNBC (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/30/a-
day-in-the-life-of-a-full-time-uber-lyft-and-juno-driver-in-nyc.html
[https://perma.cc/C27G-E846].
54 Alex Kirven, Whose Gig Is It Anyway? Technological Change, Workplace Control
and Supervision, and Workers’ Rights in the Gig Economy, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 249,
263 (2018).
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2. Health and Safety Risks and Employer Liability
Gig-workers often face more serious health and safety risks when
compared to their employee counterparts.55 The lack of a traditional
employment relationship frequently means that gig-work often lacks
structured workplace training and supervision.56 As such, many gig-workers
require and are not provided personal protective equipment, training, or
other traditional safety measures to reduce workplace risks.57 The lack of
workers’ compensation alternatives for an injured gig-worker further
exacerbates these risks.58
Furthermore, systemic and structural forces inherent to the gig economy
also negatively impact its workforce’s health. Chronic job insecurity—a
known contributor to the overall health of contingent workers—impacts
many gig-workers.59 And the increase in inequality inherent to the gig-
economy—that concentrates wealth and drives down wages through
competition—further fuels the health disparity between gig-workers and
employees.60
3. Lack of Employment Benefits
Gig-workers do not qualify for employment protections enjoyed by
employees.61 As independent contractors, they are not entitled to a myriad
55 Molly Tran & Rosemary K. Sokas, The Gig Economy and Contingent Work: An
Occupational Health Assessment, 59 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T MED. 63 (2017).
56 Craig Simonsen, Workplace Safety in the Gig Economy: New Hazards and Liabilities,
SEYFARTH (May 9, 2019), https://www.environmentalsafetyupdate.com/osha-
compliance/workplace-safety-in-the-gig-economy-new-hazards-and-liabilities/
[https://perma.cc/97WY-8UKT].
57 David Sparkman, The Gig Economy Poses New Safety Threats and Liabilities, EHS
TODAY (June 17, 2019), https://www.ehstoday.com/safety/gig-economy-poses-new-
safety-threats-and-liabilities [https://perma.cc/YUP3-ZJSX].
58 Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees,
Entrepreneurship, and Empowerment, 34 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 67, 74 (2013).
59 Tran & Sokas, supra note 55.
60 Id.
61 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 3, at 1.
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of employment protections including minimum wage guarantees, workers’
compensation, overtime compensation, family and medical leave, and
unemployment compensation.62 Perhaps most importantly, however,
“workers hired as independent contractors are not entitled to the rights and
protections of the NLRA.”63 Thus, as non-employees, gig-workers have no
avenue to engage in concerted activity, join a union, or strike to improve
wages and conditions.64 On top of all that, gig-workers are required to pay
their own payroll taxes.65
C. But Isn’t the Gig-Economy a Good Thing for Workers?
Proponents of the gig-economy assert that gig-work offers potential
significant upsides for workers, namely flexibility.66 And they are correct—
workers can decide when to work, where to work, and what kind of work to
accept.67 Supporters also argue that this flexibility can help the
underemployed with additional income to supplement their regular earnings
while allowing those excluded from the labor market to find gainful
employment.68 Although factually true, contextualizing these claims
severely diminishes their argumentative value.
These arguments incorrectly frame gig-work solely as a supplemental
income. But in 2016, gig-work was the primary source of income for 32%
of U.S. workers.69 And as previously stated, those workers incur significant
62 Id. at 11.
63 See Pivateau, supra note 58, at 75.
64 Id.
65 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 3, at 11.
66 Prassl & Risak, supra note 44, at 626.
67 Id.
68 Moshe Z. Marvit, How Crowdworkers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine,
NATION (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-crowdworkers-became-
ghosts-digital-machine/ [https://perma.cc/E6SJ-NGVM].
69 More than 1 in 3 Workers Participate in the Gig Economy, But Employers May Not
Realize It, CISION (July 17, 2018, 8:41 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/more-than-1-in-3-workers-participate-in-the-gig-economy-but-employers-may-
not-realize-it-300681928.html [https://perma.cc/5NAV-JJR9].
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expenses that participation in the gig-economy requires.70 One gig-worker
in New York City, for example, earned approximately $75,000.00 a year
driving for Uber, Lyft, and Juno six days a week.71 But he netted far less
than $50,000.00 after deducting nearly $20,000.00 in expenses and wage
taxes.72
The highly-touted flexibility offered by gig-work is often overshadowed
by the reality that many are forced to work long and irregular hours.73 Many
gig-workers switch between apps in order to combine wages, which often
extends the workers’ hours well beyond the traditional eight-hour work
day.74
Proponents of the gig-economy also argue that workers’ willingness to
participate in the gig-economy demonstrates that the relationship between
management and labor in the gig-economy is mutually beneficial.75 But this
argument fails to address how the gig-economy contributes to the structural
inequities in the modern labor market. Of course, the very nature of the gig-
economy “appeals to the possibilities for entrepreneurial control over
resources and time,” creating narratives of self-sufficiency and flexibility.76
The mechanics of many of the applications (Uber, for example) make
“being one’s own boss” seem more accessible and less far-fetched.77
However, the work structure created by the gig-economy depends on
vulnerable workers who identify with this “entrepreneurial” narrative.78
Indeed, many gig-workers—as many as 60%—report that earnings from
70 Elkins, supra note 53.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Kirven, supra note 54, at 263.




75 Prassl & Risak, supra note 44, at 626.
76 Saucedo, supra note 14, at 14.
77 Id. at 15.
78 Id. at 13–14.
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labor platforms is vital to their financial wellbeing.79 These workers “are
more likely to come from low-income households” and are “more likely to
gravitate towards physical tasks.”80 And as previously explained, gig-work
is characterized by low wages, increased health and safety risks, and lack of
labor protections, which leaves gig-workers uniquely vulnerable in the
United States workplace.81
Gig-workers deserve more.
IV. THE UNITED STATES’ BINARY WORKER CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM
A. Employee vs. Independent Contractor
The fundamental distinction between employees and independent
contractors is the degree of control the employer exerts over the worker.82
The IRS employs three “control” factors to determine a worker’s status:
behavioral control, financial control, and the relationship of the parties.83
Behavioral control is the degree to which the employer has the right to
direct the work performed by the worker.84 Training the worker, giving
detailed instructions, and dictating the tools needed to perform the job are
all indicative of an employer-employee relationship.85 Financial control
represents the employer’s investment into the equipment used by the
worker, how the worker is paid, and whether the worker’s services are
79 Id. at 18 (citing CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS ET AL., NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, WHO’S
THE BOSS: RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR LABOR STANDARDS IN OUTSOURCED
WORK 3–5 (2014)).
80 Id.
81 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 3, at 1.
82 Malik, supra note 10, at 1733.
83 Understanding Employee vs. Contractor Designation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
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available to the free market.86 The inquiry into the relationship of the parties
examines how the parties perceive their business relationship.87 None of
these factors are determinative. Rather, the more control an employer exerts
over a worker, the more likely an employer-employee relationship exists.88
Ordinarily, then, an employee is any worker who performs a service for
an employer where the latter controls how and what work will be done:89
“the relation of the [employer] and [employee] exists whenever the
employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the business shall
be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in other words, ‘not
only what shall be done, but how it shall be done.’”90 An independent
contractor, on the other hand, is usually a business owner or contractor who
provides services to other businesses.91 An independent contractor
customarily operates a separate business from their “employer,” sets their
own hours, and are only contractually bound to their “employer” for a
specified period of time.92 Therefore, the independent contractor is usually
self-employed and responsible for all of the tax obligations of the
business.93
B. Legal Ambiguity
“Few problems in the law have given greater variety of application





90 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rohn, 132 U.S. 518, 523 (1889).
91 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 83.
92 Malik, supra note 10, at 1734.
93 See Tx Zhuo, Are Sharing-Economy Workers Contractors or Employees?,
ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/249439
[https://perma.cc/T8P4-U87Q].
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between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and
what is one of the independent entrepreneurial dealing.”94
The legal distinction between an employee and an independent contractor
is unfortunately ambiguous.95 The ambiguity stems from various statutory
and common law worker classification tests that focus on one subjective
factor: “employer control.”96 While all worker classification tests employ
several factors to determine worker status, most courts place “employer
control” at the heart of the analysis.97 But “employer control” over a worker
is not unique to employer–employee relationships.98 In fact, an employer
controls the work and relationship with independent contractors when it
orders services, negotiates terms, or dictates how the work should be
done.99
To resolve this obvious grey area, courts have generally held that an
employer controls the details of an employee’s work, but only the results of
a contractor’s work.100 But this distinction fails to effectively differentiate
between employees and independent contractors. Employers often allow
employees to control the methods of performance, and many employers
control the details of an independent contractor’s work.101 Consequently,
94 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 113 (1944), overruled by Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
95 Carlson, supra note 6, at 298.
96 Pivateau, supra note 58, at 71.
97 Carlson, supra note 6, at 338.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Martin v.
Goodies Distrib., 695 So.2d 1175, 1178 (Ala. 1997).
101 See, e.g., Delivery Express v. Wash. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 9 Wash. App. 2d 131,
140 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019) (finding that the essence of the delivery drivers’ contracts
with the hiring entity was the drivers’ personal labor, and thus the hiring entity was
required to pay workers’ compensation premiums); Hix v. Minn. Workers’ Comp.
Assigned Risk Plan, 520 N.W.2d 497, 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding trucking
firm’s instructions to drivers on where to pick up and drop off loads insufficient to show
control because such instructions are necessary for drivers to serve the client).
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the distinction has become illusory because it hinges on inherently
subjective interpretations of “employer control.”102
The law recognizes the difference between an employee and an
independent contractor. Yet when the law is applied to the facts, it often
leads to confusing and inconsistent results that are ill-suited to evolving
employment relationships.103 As a result, employers are incentivized to
misclassify workers as independent contractors.104 Many employment
experts agree that worker classification laws encourage ambiguity.105
Courts have noted that these laws routinely fail to produce predictable
results for workers whose status is uncertain.106
C. Consequences of Misclassification
Worker classification has significant consequences for employers,
workers, and the state.107 From a financial perspective, the current system
encourages employers to classify workers as independent contractors.108 It
reduces labor costs and costs associated with liability under various federal
and state employment statutes.109 Some studies show that an employee costs
a business up to 30% more per worker than an independent contractor.110
102 Carlson, supra note 6, at 340.
103 Pivateau, supra note 58, at 68.
104 Carlson, supra note 6, at 298.
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., Hickey v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 699 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding “as a
practical matter, the [economic realities] test cannot be rigidly applied” in determining
the existence of an employment relationship); Richardson v. APAC–Mississippi, Inc.,
631 So. 2d 143, 150 (Miss. 1994) (“[T]he various tests to determine the type of
relationship are themselves generalities which can viewed quite differently, depending
upon which judge is applying them.”).
107 Malik, supra note 10, at 1733.
108 Braden Seibert, Protecting the Little Guys: How to Prevent the California Supreme
Court’s New “ABC” Test from Stunting Cash-Strapped Startups, 12 J. BUS.,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & LAW 181, 184 (2019).
109 See generally David Bauer, Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-
Four Billion Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138 (2015).
110 Seibert, supra note 108, at 184.
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Meanwhile, independent contractors cost a business significantly less.111
The business avoids costly legal responsibilities like payroll taxes,
employment taxes, and various employment benefits when using
independent contractors.112 Employers are further incentivized to
misclassify their workers because misclassification itself does not usually
violate any employment related statutes.113
Classification also imposes costs and risks on workers themselves.114
Misclassification unjustly deprives workers of basic employment rights
otherwise afforded to employees.115 Most workers tragically assume they
are entitled to a minimum wage, overtime pay, health and safety
regulations, and anti-discrimination protections.116 But many workers do
not realize they have been misclassified until they apply for such
employment protections.117 Additionally, misclassified workers must
litigate to obtain the correct classification and eligibility for various
employment protections.118 Alternatively, an independent contractor
misclassified as an employee may be liable for unpaid federal and state
taxes.119
Federal, state, and local governments also suffer financially from
misclassification due to underreporting and non-filing by employers.120
“Employers who misclassify their employees as independent contractors are
robbing Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and workers’
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Bauer, supra note 109, at 142.
114 Karen R. Harned et al., Creating a Workable Legal Standard for Defining an
Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & Law 93, 98 (2010).
115 See Leveling the Playing Field: Protecting Workers and Businesses Affected by
Misclassification: Hearing of the Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab., & Pensions, 111th
Cong. 7 (2010) (statement of Seth D. Harris, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab.).
116 Bauer, supra note 109, at 145.
117 Id.
118 Harned et al., supra note 114, at 98.
119 Id.
120 Bauer, supra note 109, at 146.
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compensation funds of billions of dollars and reducing federal, state, and
local tax revenues.”121 In particular, unemployment compensation
programs—a vital safety net for many workers—lose critical revenue
because employers only have to pay federal and state unemployment taxes
for employees and not for independent contractors.122 For example, a 2004
study by researchers at the University of Massachusetts and Harvard
University found that at least one in every seven construction workers were
misclassified as independent contractors.123 The study estimated that the
illegal practice cost the state about $15 million in various employment
taxes.124
This trend has permeated the gig-economy, most notably the rideshare
sector.125 The illegal practice of misclassifying workers has resulted in a
tremendous amount of lost income for rideshare drivers.126 One rideshare
driver filed suit against Uber alleging that the company owed him
unreimbursed expenses totaling over $10,000 a year.127 To top it all off,
rideshare companies consistently lower fares in an effort to increase
demand and stave off competition.128
D. Worker Classification Tests
Worker classification is vitally important. It has significant implications
for both employers and workers in taxation, tort liability, and employment
121 Id.
122 Id. at 147.
123 Robert Knox, “Independent Contractor” Abuses Among Immigrant Construction




125 See generally Pamela A. Izvanariu, Matters Settled but Not Resolved: Worker
Misclassification in the Rideshare Sector, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 133 (2016).
126 Id. at 138.
127 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2018).
128 Izvanariu, supra note 125, at 139.
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regulation.129 However, “‘[t]he tests used to determine whether a worker is
an independent contractor or an employee are complex, subjective, and
differ from law to law.’”130 This Subsection outlines some of the most
prevalent worker classification tests and how they affect the gig-workforce
and employers.
1. The Common Law Agency: “Right to Control” Test
This test “offers a natural starting place for analyzing worker
classification tests.”131 The “Right to Control” test is the most prevalent test
for determining the relationship between worker and employer.132 As its
name suggests, the employer’s “right to control” forms the heart of the legal
analysis.133 The emphasis on the “right to control” predates modern
employment law.134 This test served as the “foundation for determining
whether an injured third party may hold a principal liable for a tort
committed by its employee.”135 Under this test, an employer would be liable
for the negligence of its worker if it controlled the act that caused the injury
or failed to properly supervise the work properly.136 The common law
129 Malik, supra note 10, at 1733.
130 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-656, EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS:
IMPROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION 25
(2006).
131 Malik, supra note 10, at 1736.
132 See How to Apply the Common Law Control Test in Determining an
Employer/Employee Relationship, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/section218training/advanced_course_10.htm
[https://perma.cc/E9WH-JQGG].
133 Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law
for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 257 (2006).
134 Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy: Trying to Fit
Square Pegs into Round Holes, 31 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53, 59 (2015).
135 Id.
136 Id.
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agency test used to determine principal liability to third parties employed a
multifactor test.137
Naturally, courts began to utilize this test to classify employment
relationships.138 Courts were notably more inclined to give additional
weight to factors other than the right to control in order to extend protection
to workers.139 The Restatement (Second) of Agency lists the factors to be
considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing
the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.140
137 Id.; see generally Richard A. Bales & Christian Patrick Woo, The Uber Million Dollar
Question: Are Uber Drivers Employees or Independent Contractors?, 68 MERCER L.
REV. 461 (2017).
138 See id.
139 Sprague, supra note 134, at 59.
140 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
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Each of these factors are to be considered and balanced by the
decisionmaker.141 No formula exists to determine exactly how the factors
should be balanced.142 Importantly, though, this test is not conjunctive.
Failure to satisfy one factor does not preclude a finding of employee
status.143 But while the test is not conjunctive, the primary focus remains on
the employer’s right to control over the worker.144 That is the determinative
analysis.145 “Even if the employer never exercises control, if [it] has the
right to, the worker is likely an employee.”146
The lack of a formula or direction as to how to balance the factors
unfortunately presents a unique problem.147 No bright line rule for
classification exists using this test.148 There is no consensus as to how the
factors should be weighed.149 Therefore, the test can and has led to
arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent application of the law by
decisionmakers.150
2. The “ABC” Test
The “ABC” worker classification test presumes every worker to be an
employee.151 It differs from the common law agency test because it is
conjunctive, rather than disjunctive.152 The test originates from the
Massachusetts legislature’s change to the statutory definition of
141 Jenna Amato Moran, Independent Contractor or Employee? Misclassification of






147 Pivateau, supra note 58, at 79.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 68, 76–77.
151 Jean Murray, What Is the ABC Test for Independent Contractors?, THE BALANCE
SMALL BUS. (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-is-the-abc-test-for-
independent-contractors-4586615 [https://perma.cc/24EF-FQNM].
152 Id.
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independent contracting.153 The ABC test places the burden of proving
worker status on the party seeking the employment tax exemption.154
Additionally, the ABC test requires the party with the burden of proof to
satisfy a three-pronged test.155
Under the ABC Test, a worker is an independent contractor if:
A. The individual is free from control and direction in connection
with the performance of the service, both under his contract for
performance of service and in fact; and
B. The service is performed outside the usual course of the
business of the employer; and
C. The individual is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature
as that involved in the service performed.156
The “ABC” test was designed in part to address the disproportionate
bargaining power that exists between low-wage workers and their
employers.157 Crucially, each individual prong must be satisfied to deny a
worker employee status.158 Thus, a worker is an employee if the employer
fails to satisfy any of the three prongs.159
153 Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An
Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L.
& SOC. CHANGE 53, 65 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (2014).
154 Murray, supra note 151.
155 Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 153, at 65.
156 Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018)
(establishing a three-pronged conjunctive test which the hiring entity must satisfy for its
workers to be considered independent contractors).
157 Seibert, supra note 108, at 193.
158 Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 153, at 65; Sean Kingston, Examining the
Dynamex ‘ABC Test’ by Various On-Demand Worker Types, FISCHER PHILLIPS (May 8,
2018), https://www.fisherphillips.com/gig-employer/examining-the-dynamex-abc-test-
by-various [https://perma.cc/32WT-2ZPP].
159 Seibert, supra note 108, at 193.
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This test has unsurprisingly been harshly criticized for overly restricting
the use of independent contractors.160 Some employers claim it injects
uncertainty into employment relationships, which makes it nearly
impossible to use independent contractors.161 And many bona fide
independent contractors worry that the test robs them of their prized
independence and flexibility.162
Detractors further contend that the ABC test fails to address worker
classification on a macro level because it does not consider negative
implications on consumer and business innovation.163 They assert that taxes
and benefits that come with employee classification increase overhead costs
which are then passed onto the consumer.164 They also argue these costs
will stifle the emergence of “game-changing” start-ups like Uber.165
But proponents of the ABC test retort that the provision of basic
employment protections and benefits far outweighs the costs imposed on
businesses.166 First, they argue that worker misclassification increases the
burden on the taxpayer to the tune of $7 billion for California alone.167 A
laid off worker with no unemployment insurance, for example, must rely on
government assistance to put food on the table.168 And a worker injured on
160 Stephen L. Carter, California Truck Ruling Exposes Weakness of Gig Economy Law
AB5, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-
09/ab5-california-law-threatens-gig-workers [https://perma.cc/P222-WKCZ].
161 Ben Burdick, Recent Case: Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 40
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 176 (2019).
162 Devin Fehely, Heavy Truck Drivers Sharply Criticizing AB5, California’s Gig
Economy Worker Bill, CBS (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2019/09/17/heavy-truck-drivers-sharply-criticizing-
ab5-californias-gig-economy-worker-bill/ [https://perma.cc/4HCV-C2RU].
163 Andoyan, supra note 23, at 169.
164 Bales & Woo, supra note 137, at 468–69.
165 Andoyan, supra note 23, at 169–70.
166 Steve Smith, 5 Reasons the CA Legislature Must Say Yes on AB5, CAL. LAB. FED’N
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the job with no health insurance or workers’ compensation is often forced
to go to the emergency room—often the most expensive option for medical
treatment.169
3. Washington State’s Classification Test
Washington State uses a conjunctive test similar to the ABC test.170 The
statutes and common law that make up Washington’s test render it difficult
for an employer to classify a worker as an independent contractor.171
Employees and many independent contractors in Washington are entitled to
a variety of benefits. The state’s statutory definition of employee is more
inclusive than most. The definition includes every person in Washington
“engaged in employment of an employer under [Title 51].”172
Curiously, Washington’s statutory definition of “employee” also includes
workers “under an independent contract, the essence of which is his or her
personal labor.”173 So, an independent contractor that provides primarily
personal labor to an employer may still be considered a covered worker.174
169 Id.; Janet Hunt, Average Cost of an ER Visit, BALANCE (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://www.thebalance.com/average-cost-of-an-er-visit-4176166
[https://perma.cc/R9WB-R7WK].
170 See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.180 (2008);
Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Lyons Enters., Inc., 347 P.3d 464, 471 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015);
White v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 294 P.2d 650, 654 (Wash. 1956).
171 Id.; see also Spencer Parr, What Is the Washington State Industrial Insurance Act?,
WASH. L. CTR. (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonlawcenter.com/labor-industries-
washington-state-industrial-insurance-act/ [https://perma.cc/HE4Z-UXER].
172 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.180 (2008) (“Every person in this state who is engaged in
the employment of an employer under this title whether by way of manual labor or
otherwise in the course of his or her employment; also every person in this state who is
engaged in the employment of or who is working under an independent contract, the
essence of which is his or her personal labor for an employer under this title, whether by
way of manual labor or otherwise, in the course of his or her employment, or as an
exception to the definition of worker, a person is not a worker if he or she meets the test
set[s] set forth in subsections (1) through (6) of RCW 51.08.195.”).
173 Id.
174 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.180 (2008); Lyons, 347 P.3d at 471; White, 294 P.2d at
654.
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Washington courts apply a two-part test to determine whether
independent contractors are covered workers.175 First, courts look to the
“realities of the situation” to determine whether labor is the essence of the
contract between the worker and the employer.176 Therefore, if the worker’s
labor serves as the method to execute the contract, then it is considered the
“essence of the contract.”177
If the labor is “the essence of the contract,” the question then becomes
whether the labor is personal.178 Labor is not personal for purposes of the
statute if it is performed by an independent contractor:
A. who must of necessity own or supply machinery or equipment
(as distinguished from the usual hand tools) to perform the
contract . . . , or
B. who obviously could not perform the contract without
assistance . . . , or
C. who of necessity or choice employs others to do all or part of
the work he has contracted to perform.179
Satisfaction of one of these three factors renders a worker uncovered by the
Act.180 And ordinary vehicles and supplies are notably not deemed
specialized equipment sufficient to satisfy part (A) of the personal labor
test.181
The definitional statute does, however, carve out another exemption of
certain workers from coverage if it meets a six-part conjunctive test
175 Lyons, 347 P.3d at 471.
176 Id. at 471.
177 Id. (holding that the essence of the cleaning contracts between the cleaners and the
customers was labor because it was through the cleaners’ labor that customers’ facilities
were made clean).
178 White v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 294 P.2d 650 (1956).
179 Id. at 653.
180 Id. at 654; Lyons, 347 P.3d at 471–73.
181 Henry Indus., Inc., v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 381 P.3d 172, 179 (2016).
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outlined in RCW 51.08.195.182 A worker is considered a covered worker
unless all six parts are satisfied.183
The first factor requires the worker to be free from the control or
direction of the hiring entity.184 Second, the service provided by the worker
must be either outside the usual course of business of the hiring entity or
performed outside all of the places of business of the hiring entity.185 Third,
the worker must be customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, profession, or business that is of the same nature as the
service the worker is providing, or the worker must have a principal place
of business eligible for a business deduction for federal income taxes.186
Fourth, the worker must be responsible for filing expense deductions with
the IRS for the type of business the worker is conducting.187 Fifth, the
worker must have established an account with Washington State’s
Department of Revenue and other state agencies for the business the worker
is conducting.188 And, sixth, the worker must maintain a separate set of
books or records that reflects the income and expenses of the business
which the worker is conducting.189
Washington’s employee definitions and common law tests presume
workers are covered. Similar to concerns with the ABC test, executives of
gig-companies are concerned about the implications such laws have on their
business models, which rely heavily on independent contractor
classification.190
182 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.180 (2008).
183 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195 (2008).
184 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195(1) (2008).
185 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195(2) (2008).
186 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195(3) (2008).
187 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195(4) (2008).
188 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195(5) (2008).
189 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195(6) (2008).
190 James C. Hardman, Crimping Entrepreneurship: The Attack on Motor Carrier
Sponsored Equipment Acquisition Programs, 35 TRANSP. L.J. 157 (2008).
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Washington’s strict employee definitions do bode well for gig-workers
because RCW 51.08.195(1)–(3) closely resemble the ABC test.191 Both of
these classification tests would force gig-companies to classify many of
their workers as employees because they exert control over them.192 Indeed,
lawsuits have alleged this very premise.193 While gig-companies will likely
find success arguing that their workers are in an independently established
trade, it will be difficult to prove that their workers provide services outside
the employer’s usual business.194
V. THE MIDDLE GROUND: A GIG-WORKER CLASSIFICATION—THE
MARKETPLACE CONTRACTOR
The meteoric growth of the gig-economy has left operational regulatory
structures scrambling in an attempt to scale up regulations to protect
vulnerable gig-workers.195 Technological advancements intrinsic to the
growth of the gig-economy are tied to heightened efficiency, consolidated
risk management, and, ultimately, diminished oversight.196 Recent
settlements from gig-economy giants Uber and Lyft have allowed both
companies to retain their independent contractor models.197 Yet the
settlements do nothing to resolve the underlying misclassification issue.198
191 Compare WASH. REV. CODE §51.08.195 (2008), with Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v.
Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
192 Hannah Wiley, Are Contracted Workers ‘Oppressed’ in California? Debate over
‘Gig’ Economy Heats Up, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 11, 2019),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article232513822.html.
193 Jacob Demmitt, Uber Sued by Former Worker Seeking at Least $44M on Behalf of All
Washington State Uber Drivers, GEEKWIRE (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.geekwire.com/2015/uber-hit-with-another-lawsuit-over-driver-
classification-this-time-in-washington-state/ [https://perma.cc/Q96M-NLAL].
194 Kingston, supra note 158.
195 Azar, supra note 43.
196 Id.
197 Izvanariu, supra note 125, at 134.
198 Id.
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To directly and efficiently address this issue, Washington State must add
a marketplace contractor classification to its worker classification laws.
This new, hybrid classification must cure the deficiencies of the current
workplace structure that exists in the gig-economy and focus on core
employment protections for gig-workers. A focus on core employment
protections can generally assist in combatting, from an ideological
standpoint, dehumanization, and the risk of creating a new group of
invisible workers.199 From a practical standpoint, the hybrid
classificationcan stress the recognition of the ultimate human character
inherent to gig-economy work, even if such work is predominantly
mediated by impersonal IT tools like smart-phone applications.200
Therefore, this new classification must address workplace safety; require
workers’ compensation, minimum wage, and overtime wages; and grant
gig-workers greater recourse for employment discrimination.
A. Workplace Safety
The marketplace contractor classification should serve to improve
workplace conditions for gig-workers by treating gig-companies more like
traditional employers. To dramatically improve conditions—for both
workers and consumers alike—the new classification should impose
vicarious liability on gig-employers. Vicarious liability is a legal doctrine
that holds employers liable for the action, negligent or otherwise, of an
employee when the employee was acting within the course and scope of
their employment.201
Imposing vicarious liability for gig-employers can lead to an overall
improvement in workplace standards.202 Increased liability incentivizes gig-
199 De Stefano, supra note 33, at 499.
200 Id.
201 How Does Vicarious Liability Affect Employers?, Linkilaw (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://linkilaw.com/employee-regulations/vicarious-liability/ [https://perma.cc/5EZL-
5GMC].
202 Saucedo, supra note 14, at 19.
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companies to provide proper safety training, personal protective equipment,
and other various workplace protections and safety measures that ensure a
safer environment.203 Given the independent nature of gig-work, safety
trainings for gig-workers are necessary to allow them to execute their job
functions more safely.204 Because of the transformative nature of the gig-
economy, gig-companies should be required to proactively mitigate
prevalent safety hazards or face legal liability as a consequence.205
Not surprisingly, gig-companies fiercely argue that safety hazards
inherent to the gig-economy—road traffic safety, public interaction, use of
household cleaning agents, etc.—are known and present dangers that their
workers should be addressing themselves.206 The companies contend that
the current regulatory framework for prevention of workplace hazards does
not apply in the absence of a traditional employment relationship.207 On this
last point, gig-companies are correct. The lack of an employment
relationship puts the onus on gig-workers to institute measures to prevent
known workplace hazards.208
Thus, Washington State’s new marketplace contractor classification
should establish a more concrete employment relationship by imposing
vicarious liability on gig-companies. In doing so, regulatory safety
measures currently in place for traditional employers will be implemented
for gig-workers as well.
203 James L. Curtis et al., Workplace Safety in the Gig Economy: New Hazards and
Liabilities, SEYFARTH (May 9, 2019),
https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2019/05/workplace-safety-in-the-gig-
economy-new-hazards-and-liabilities/ [https://perma.cc/42HN-GZU5].
204 Sparkman, supra note 57.
205 Id.
206 Tran & Sokas, supra note 55.
207 Id.
208 Id.
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B. Minimum Wage & Overtime Wages
The marketplace contractor classification must also enforce state
minimum wage, scheduling, and overtime regulations to further improve
workplace conditions for gig-workers.209 Many gig-companies pay their
workers on a piecework basis.210 So, a driver for DoorDash , for example, is
paid only upon completion of the assigned delivery.211 Consequently, a
DoorDash driver might be paid less than the minimum wage on a slow day
where the driver has to wait more than twenty minutes between deliveries.
This, in turn, causes many gig-workers to work long hours for multiple
companies to make up the difference.212
Some gig-companies have addressed this issue on their own initiative.
Companies such as Favor—an Austin-based food delivery application—
have essentially guaranteed all of their drivers a minimum wage.213 If a
Favor driver does not meet the company’s minimum pay guarantee, then
Favor makes up the difference.214 Washington’s new classification must
codify such a guarantee from all gig-companies operating within the state.
However, gig-companies correctly point out that it would be difficult to
apply an hourly wage to workers when they can work for multiple
employers in any given day.215 The gig-companies argue that it may be
“impossible in many circumstances to attribute independent workers’ work
209 Sarah Kessler, Could a Minimum Wage Work in the Gig Economy?, FAST CO. (Apr. 6,
2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3058599/could-a-minimum-wage-work-in-the-gig-
economy [https://perma.cc/E7MM-U952].
210 Stewart & Stanford, supra note 28, at 421.




215 SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT
WORKER” 2, 6–8 (2015),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_c
entury_work_krueger_harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EPR-GWW3].
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hours to any employer.”216 But it is not impossible; rather, a relatively
simple solution can solve this “impossible” dilemma posited by gig-
companies. Each company should be required to submit to the state the time
worked and pay per hour for each of their workers. The state should then
compile this data and determine whether a worker’s wage satisfies
minimum wage requirements. If not, then the state should issue a wage
order to each gig-company and apportion the amount to be paid by each
company based on the hours the worker labored for each company.
In addition to supporting a minimum wage, the marketplace contractor
classification must extend the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) overtime
compensation provisions to gig-workers. The FLSA does not limit worker
hours but instead requires additional compensation for hours worked in
excess of forty hours per workweek.217 Generally, this pay amounts to one-
and-a-half times a worker’s regular pay rate.218
Similar to their minimum wage concerns, gig-companies have expressed
doubt as to how overtime wages can be tracked when workers labor for
multiple employers.219 A centralized mechanism—as suggested above—
solves this problem. Apportioning overtime pay based on hours worked for
a particular gig-company allows for overtime pay in the gig-economy. By
apportioning overtime pay based on hours worked, each individual
company will likely not be overburdened.
C. Workers’ Compensation
The marketplace contractor classification should also require gig-
companies to pay into Washington State’s industrial insurance fund, albeit
at a reduced rate. The industrial insurance fund is Washington’s workers’
compensation fund that pays for medical expenses and lost wages that result
216 Id. at 2.
217 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 3, at 11.
218 Id.
219 Kessler, supra note 48.
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from an on-the-job injury.220 The funds and other workers’ compensation
laws provide much needed security to workers by providing temporary (or
sometimes permanent) income to injured workers.221 Indeed, these
payments are frequently the first and only form of compensation available
to workers injured on the job.222 The fund ensures workers receive access to
care and intensive medical treatments if necessary.223 It also provides
important income security pay to compensate an injured worker for past and
future time lost due to the workplace injury.224
Workers’ compensation laws thankfully operate with a no-fault
provision, which means workers are protected regardless of who is at fault
for the injury.225 This no-fault provision extends to employers as well, and
the worker is compensated through a fund into which every employer
pays.226 Therefore, a worker is entitled to workers’ compensation if they are
injured within the course and scope of their employment.227
Workplace danger inherent to many gig economy jobs requires workers’
compensation to help protect the uniquely vulnerable workforce. Many gig-
companies operate in higher risk industries where workers transport
passengers and freight.228 Using public roads and highways to carry out this
work is inherently dangerous.229 Furthermore, the gig-workplace is made
220 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.175 (1977).
221 See generally Jon Rehm, Portability, the Gig Economy and Workers Compensation,
WORKERS’ COMP. WATCH (June 1, 2017),
https://workerscompensationwatch.com/2017/06/01/portability-the-gig-economy-and-
workers-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/4YZ9-NTNK].
222 LU JINKS, WHY PAY MORE? THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED WAGE REPLACEMENT
BENEFITS IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 2 (2019).
223 Id.
224 Id.





228 James L. Curtis et al., supra note 203.
229 Id.
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more dangerous because many gig-companies employ transient workforces
that may lack the knowledge and skills to perform their jobs safely.230
Always concerned with costs, gig-companies worry that workers’
compensation payments would overly burden them, which would then push
costs onto the consumer.231 Gig-companies also argue that the legal regime
requiring such taxes would handicap their ability to recruit workers to keep
pace with rising demand, adding significant costs to their bottom line.232
Uber has stated that employment taxes like workers’ compensation could
add an additional $500 million in costs per year.233
These worries are valid but overblown. A reduced payment into the
state’s workers’ compensation fund will not impose debilitating operational
costs for gig-companies. Washington employers pay into the workers’
compensation on an hourly basis.234 This rate is adjusted to be higher or
lower depending on how dangerous the worker’s job is.235 For example, an
accounting firm may pay $0.18 per hour per accountant, while a firm
specializing in bridge and tunnel construction can pay up to $3.68 per
hour.236 Taxi-cab companies—who perform a service similar to Uber, Lyft,
and many other gig-giants—pay $0.62 per hour.237 Thus, a rate lower than
$0.62 per hour cannot be said to overly burden most gig-companies.
230 Id.
231 See generally Johana Bhuiyan, Treat Workers as Employees? Uber, Lyft and Others





234 See WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUS., 2017-2020 Premium Base Rate Changes
(2020), https://lni.wa.gov/insurance/_docs/2020ratesbustypeclasscode.pdf (last visited
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Further, since 2018, Washington has decreased its workers’ compensation
premiums for many businesses.238
In any event, companies like Uber—whose net worth in 2018 was valued
at $82 billion—cannot realistically argue that less than $0.62 per hour per
driver, would destroy their business model.239
D. Workplace Discrimination
Lastly, the marketplace contractor classification must also directly focus
on anti-employment discrimination and the civil rights of gig-workers. In
doing so, the hybrid classification should expand the scope of Washington
law under chapter 49.60 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) to
specifically include gig-workers and independent contractors.240
Chapter 49.60 is a general anti-discrimination chapter. The chapter
makes it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin,
sex, or religion.241 It also prohibits retaliation against a worker because they
complained of discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or
participated in an employment discrimination lawsuit.242
But the statute as currently written is ambiguous. A plain language
reading of the definition of “employer” in chapter 49.60 leaves it unclear as
to whether the chapter covers gig-employers as well.243 Unfortunately,
many courts have an implicit understanding that independent contractors
238 Average Cost of Workers’ Comp in Washington Dropping in 2018, INS. J. (Dec. 1,
2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2017/12/01/472944.htm
[https://perma.cc/CKR9-MDZJ].
239 Adeloa Seun, How Much Is Uber Worth in 2019 and How Do They Make Their
Money?, JUST RICHEST (May 31, 2020), https://justrichest.com/uber-worth-money/
[https://perma.cc/5LQK-SWQB].
240 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 is a chapter of Washington State law that protects all
people in Washington from unfair and discriminatory practices, including in
employment. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (2020).
241 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2020).
242 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.210 (2011).
243 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040(d)(10) (1995).
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cannot claim employment discrimination violations because they do not
have the same rights and protections as employees.244
Therefore, Washington must amend the definition of employer in chapter
49.60 to specifically include gig-workers. Expanding the scope in this way
would address the exploitation of structural inequalities that exist in the gig-
economy.245
VI. THE STATUTE(S)
Implementing the marketplace contractor classification requires action
from the state legislature. The current independent contractor-employee test
is overly stringent and needs reform. At the present time, many states have
in place statutes that delineate the rights of gig-workers. Thus, there is no
need for Washington to reinvent the wheel. Instead, Washington should
adopt definitional provisions from other states and incorporate them into the
Revised Code of Washington.
This section will examine Arizona’s statutes that define gig-companies,
digital platforms, and gig-workers. It will then explain the key changes to
those statutes that are necessary to effectuate the goals outlined in the
previous section.
To avoid the ambiguity that comes with the binary classification system,
the Washington legislature must first properly define gig-companies, digital
platforms, and gig-workers. Arizona and many other states have adequately
defined these terms by specifying who qualifies as a gig-company and gig-
worker. Washington should adopt these definitional statutes, but with
important changes, to expand the rights of gig-workers.
Arizona defines “marketplace contractor” as follows:
1. Qualified marketplace contractor means any person or
organization, including an individual, corporation, limited liability
company, partnership, sole proprietor or other entity, that enters
244 Cal. Trucking Ass’n v. Su., 903 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2018).
245 Saucedo, supra note 14, at 20.
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into an agreement with a qualified marketplace platform to use the
qualified marketplace platform’s digital platform to provide
service to third-party individuals or entities seeking those
services.246
Arizona further defines “digital platforms”:
2. Qualified marketplace platform means an organization,
including, but not limited to, a corporation, limited liability
company, partnership, sole proprietor or any other entity, that
both:
a) Operates as a digital website or digital
smartphone application that facilitates the provision of
services by qualified marketplace contractors to
individuals or entities seeking such services.
b) Accepts service requests from the public only
through its digital website or digital smartphone
application, and does not accept service requests by
telephone, by facsimile or in person as physical retail
locations.247
And Arizona explicitly defines gig-workers as marketplace contractors:
A. A qualified marketplace contractor shall be treated as an
independent contractor for all purposes under state and local laws,
regulations and ordinances, including employment security laws
and workers’ compensation laws, if all of the following apply:
1. All or substantially all of the payment for the services
performed by the qualified marketplace contractor is
related to the performance of services or other output.
2. The services performed by the qualified marketplace
contractor are governed by a written contract executed
between the qualified marketplace contractor and a
qualified marketplace platform.
246 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1603(E) (2016).
247 Id.
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3. The written contract required by paragraph 2 of this
subsection provides for all of the following:
A. That the qualified marketplace contractor is
providing services as an independent contractor
and not an employee.
B. That, pursuant to paragraph 1 of this
subsection, all or substantially all of the payment
paid to the contractor shall be based on the
performances of services or other output.
C. That the qualified marketplace contractor is
allowed to work any hours or schedules the
qualified marketplace contractor chooses. If the
qualified marketplace contractor elects to work
specified hours or schedules, a contract may
require the qualified marketplace contactor to
perform work during the selected hours or
schedules.
D. That the qualified marketplace contractor
does not restrict the contractor’s ability to
perform services for other parties.248
Arizona’s definitional statutes provide an excellent blueprint for statutory
definitions of gig-workers and digital platforms. But they fail to provide
any additional rights to gig-workers. Rather, the Arizona statutes essentially
classify all gig-workers as independent contractors, thus depriving them of
many employment rights previously discussed.249 Therefore, these statutes
render gig-workers functionally the same as independent contractors.
Washington’s legislature must correct this fatal flaw. Washington must
create a functionally separate classification for gig-workers that affords
them more rights and protections than traditional independent contractors.
248 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1603(A)(1)–(3) (2016).
249 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1603(A)–(E) (2016).
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To achieve this goal, Washington’s statutory definitions of “worker” and
“employer” must be amended to specifically include the new marketplace
contractor classification. The legislature should therefore explicitly revise
those definitions in RCW Title 51.
Currently, RCW § 51.08.180 defines “worker” as “every person engaged
in the employment of an employer under this title.”250 This statute should
simply be amended to expand the scope of the definition and define
“worker” as “every person engaged in the employment, including
marketplace contractors, of an employer, including under this title.” RCW §
51.08.070, on the other hand, defines “employer” as “any person, body of
persons, corporate or otherwise . . . engaged in any work covered by the
provisions of this title.”251 This statute should similarly be amended to
define “employer” as “any person, body of persons, corporate or otherwise,
including digital platforms . . . engaged in any work covered by the
provisions of this title.” In addition, the legislature should incorporate the
definition of digital platform and mandate that any such entity must pay
workers’ compensation premiums at a rate of 50% of the rate established
for traditional businesses.
The definition of “employer” in RCW Chapter § 49.60.040(d)(10) must
also be amended in a similar fashion. To subject gig-companies to
Washington’s anti-discrimination laws, the definition must include digital
platform employers. RCW § 49.60.040(d)(10) currently defines “employer”
as “any person acting in the interest of employer, directly or indirectly, who
employs eight or more persons.”252 The statute should be amended to define
“employer” as “any person acting in the interest of an employer, including a
digital platform employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more
persons, including marketplace contractors.”
250 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.180 (2008).
251 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.070 (2008).
252 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040(11) (1995).
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These amended statutes would specifically define marketplace contractor
and digital platform, include those terms in RCW Title 51 and RCW Title
49, and mandate reduced workers’ compensation premiums. The
amendments would impose increased liability and responsibility on gig-
companies. Additionally, the amendments would provide valuable
protections to gig-workers while at the same time not overly burdening gig-
companies’ business models with exorbitant costs.
VII. CRITICISMS
Gig-economy champions often argue that creating a new hybrid
classification would have many negative implications on the economy,
employers, and workers.253
First, some argue that the creation of a new legal classification may
complicate, rather than simplify, worker classification issues.254 Critics
contend that a hybrid test would be more complicated than a test based on
the employer’s control because it would be difficult to assess from where
the worker’s sources of income are derived.255 However, the amendments in
the previous section leave this argument largely meritless. The current legal
definitions of employee and independent contractor revolve around the right
to control of the hiring entity and are “slippery” when applied in practice
because of their inherent ambiguity.256 The amendments above are not
ambiguous at all. Instead, they adequately define the specific workers and
types of employers to which they apply. As explained earlier in this note,
the ambiguity that arises from the binary classification system arises from
253 De Stefano, supra note 33, at 495.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 See, e.g., Hickey v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 699 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that
“as a practical matter, the economic realities test cannot be rigidly applied” in
determining the existence of an employment relationship.); Richardson v. APAC–Miss.,
Inc., 631 So.2d 143, 150 (Miss. 1994) (“[T]he various tests to determine the type of
relationship are themselves generalities which can viewed quite differently, depending
upon which judge is applying them.”).
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the “right to control.”257 Specifically defining marketplace contractor and
digital platform obviates the need to use the “right to control” or any other
classification tests.
Second, and most importantly, gig-companies argue that a hybrid
classification could lead to higher costs for the consumer and reduced
income opportunity for gig-workers.258 However, cost concerns of gig-
companies are largely predicated on the passage of Assembly Bill 5 in
California, which would require gig-companies to pay a multitude of
employment and labor taxes, including workers’ compensation.259 The
proposed statute and amendment above, however, would only require gig-
companies to pay a reduced workers’ compensation rate, take on increased
liability (which would be offset by workers’ compensation), and be bound
by anti-discrimination provisions of Title 49. While such a statute would
surely increase the cost of operation for gig-companies, it cannot be said to
be overly burdensome. The statute would also provide much needed core
protections and benefits to a vulnerable sector of workers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The current binary worker classification system is inadequate and fails to
protect vulnerable gig-workers while also protecting the expansion of a new
burgeoning economy. Worker classifications that depend on a multi-factor
test are inherently ambiguous and lead to the misclassification of workers as
independent contractors. Conversely, the ABC Test and Washington State’s
current classification test are overly burdensome, and they make it virtually
impossible to classify a worker as an independent contractor. For these
257 Carlson, supra note 6, at 298.
258 Megan Rose Dickey, Uber Plans to Keep Defending Independent Contractor Model
for Drivers, TECH CRUNCH (Sept. 11, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/11/uber-ab-
5-independent-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/WFD4-UFW7].
259 Judy Lin, What Happens to Uber and Lyft Drivers once AB 5 Passes?, CAL MATTERS
(Sept. 5, 2019), https://calmatters.org/economy/2019/09/what-happens-to-uber-and-lyft-
drivers-once-ab-5-passes/ [https://perma.cc/SJ5R-K7ZD].
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reasons, Washington State must adopt the marketplace contractor
classification to grant much needed protections to vulnerable gig-workers.
